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LEONARDO DA VINCI AND THE 861
REGUIATIONS
Charles I. Kingson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Leonardo, it is said, was the last to understand all human
knowledge. Now the rate of change threatens our ability just to
keep up. People must constantly teach others to use everyday
machines, and the instant availability of information gives rise
to financial instruments unheard of a few years ago. To evalu-
ate how, or even what, new goods and services are being of-
fered becomes bewildering, as does whether they are goods or
services.1 What is certain is that a growing proportion of
wealth is represented by intangibles, and what is uncertain is
whether and where to tax it.
This sets a background for my comments on David
Rosenbloom's excellent and well thought out paper.2 Based on
the sometimes competing goals of efficiency, equity, and sim-
plicity, the paper makes several proposals about the way in
which the United States (and perhaps other countries) should
tax foreign income earned by its residents.3
More specifically, it proposes that the United States
should:
a. treat income of any controlled foreign subsidiary as income
of its United States parent;
b. classify jurisdictions as either high-tax (like France) or
low-tax (like the Cayman Islands);
c. exempt from United States tax all active business income
* The author is currently a principal at the accounting firm of Ernst &
Young, LLP. He teaches at Columbia Law School, Yale Law School, and New York
University School of Law. He also has served as the International Tax Counsel at
the Department of the Treasury. Mr. Kingson is the author of INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION (Aspen Law & Business 1998), a leading casebook in the field. Mr.
Kingson is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School.
1. Alan Greenspan once joked that no one should be allowed to buy stock in
a company unless he could explain what it did.
2. H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of Foreign
Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOM J. INTL L. 1525 (2001).
3. This comment assumes familiarity with the paper, and this summary de-
scribes only some proposals. It omits, for example, the proposal to grant only de-
ductions in respect of foreign taxes on non-exempt income.
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attributable to a permanent establishment in a high-tax
jurisdiction (unless such income is not likely to be taxed at
regular rates); and
d. tax the gain on any assets transferred to a high-tax perma-
nent establishment (a section 367 issue).
The comments, like the proposals, become intertwined:4
Exemption, current inclusion of income, simplicity, and the
section 367 issue. Let me start with exemption.
Many years ago, a member of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee-when confronted with what he thought were intemper-
ate requests for real estate income tax incentives-threatened
to exempt the entire industry from tax. Similarly, even without
limiting its application to high-tax jurisdictions, exempting
foreign active business income from tax might increase reve-
nue. United States tax on foreign source income that consists
of royalties, interest from related parties, and exports no lon-
ger could be offset by credits for foreign tax on active business
income; and losses of foreign branches no longer would be
deductible, by reason of section 265.
Combining exemption with the current inclusion of all
controlled foreign subsidiary income and limiting the exemp-
tion to high-tax countries, would increase substantially the
revenue gain. Since the paper asks what kind of system we
should start with, most practical objections (including treaty
obligations) seem beside the point. But there are some signifi-
cant differences between Professor Rosenbloom's exemption-
curn-inclusion proposal and current exemption systems.
II. THE PROPOSAL COMPARED TO CURRENT EXEMPTION
SYSTEMS
The obvious disadvantage to taxpayers under an exemp-
tion system-as compared with the current United States
credit system-is the inability to reduce tax on royalties, inter-
est, exports, and low-taxed active business income by excess
credits in respect of other business income. The obvious disad-
vantage to taxpayers under Professor Rosenbloom's propos-
al-as compared with current exemption systems-is the in-
4. Professor Rosenbloom disarmingly points out some of the pressure points
of his own proposals, such as the need to allocate deductions under either a credit
or exemption system.
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ability to defer residence tax on low-taxed business income. In
part, the acceptability of foreign exemption systems may rest
both on:
a. deferral of residence tax as well as some equivalence of a
credit in respect of low-taxed business income; and
b. the indirect exemption of other income by the lack of 861
regulations.
A. Deferral
As for deferral, exemption countries generally do not tax
unremitted low-taxed active business income.5 As for the
equivalence of a credit, they sometimes have exempted such
income from tax even when remitted. This has been done
through tax-sparing treaties with developing countries, treaties
to which the United States will not agree.6
Exempting low-taxed business income reduces the disad-
vantage to taxpayers in exemption countries of being unable to
use excess credits against residence tax on royalties, interest,
or export sales. The reason is that, in the United States, cred-
its also must be used against the low-taxed business income
system that other countries exempt. As a result, only excess
credit as to all business income is available to reduce residence
tax on the other items.7
B. Indirect Exemption
To my knowledge, countries other than the United States
do not have meaningful section 861 regulations.8 In exemption
5. In this discussion, active business income necessarily does not include
what the United States would consider foreign base company income.
6. Because of what the OECD has labeled harmful tax competition, high-tax
exemption countries may now be less willing to conclude tax-sparing treaties. But
those treaties long have allowed the equivalent of cross-crediting between high-
taxed and low-taxed foreign business income.
7. Moreover, exemption countries use a tax credit system to reduce residence
tax on foreign royalties and interest. In some cases, tax-sparing treaties allow
reduction of such tax by hypothetical taxes of the source country. See Article 24 of
the tax treaty between Germany and Brazil.
8. Japan, a credit country whose international tax system was based partly
on that of the United States (United States' constitutional cases are precedent in
Japan), does not seem to have meaningful 861 regulations. A Japanese lawyer
once explained his firm's expertise in Japanese-U.S. section 482 transfer pricing
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systems, this allows deductions attributable to exempt foreign
income to reduce residence tax on non-exempt income. By
contrast, deductions attributable to the United States equiva-
lent of exempt foreign income-foreign income of taxpayers in
an excess credit position-do not reduce residence tax on any
income at all. This requires a bit of explanation.
As an economic rather than technical matter, under the
United States' credit system, any foreign general limitation
income of companies in an excess credit position is exempt
from United States tax. To illustrate, assume that a company
has $100 of Canadian business income on which it has paid
$70 of tax. The excess $35 of tax credit can offset United
States tax an additional $100 of foreign source-royalty, subsid-
iary interest, or export income, making $200 economically ex-
empt from tax.
As a corollary, any research or interest deduction allocated
to foreign source income by the section 861 regulations will
decrease foreign income below $200; and that decrease, reduc-
ing income that already is economically exempt from United
States tax, makes the deduction useless. In effect, section 861
acts like section 265-it disallows deductions allocable to ex-
empt income. Thus, when a foreign country does not allocate
deductions against exempt foreign business income, it allows
deductions that the United States economically would disallow.
Those deductions reduce residence tax on non-exempt in-
come-including foreign royalties, interest, or exports-which
the United States economically would exempt by tax credits.
To use the above example, suppose that the United States
would allocate $60 of deductions to the $200 of foreign income,
of which $40 would be allocable to the Canadian business in-
come: the foreign country would allocate no deductions to the
active business income. In effect, the United States credit sys-
tem has exempted $140 of foreign net income from residence
country tax (the $200 economically exempted by credits, less
the $60 of effectively disallowed deductions). But the exemp-
tion system also has exempted $140 of net income from resi-
dence country tax (the $100 explicitly exempted, plus the $40
of deductions used, thereby eliminating residence tax non-ex-
matters. I asked him what Japan did about the corollary of allocating income to a
residence jurisdiction and allocating deductions to a source jurisdiction. He had not
heard of the issue.
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empt income).9
III. SIMPLICITY
A. Whether the Need Exists
To begin with, in the foreign income area specificity may
be better than simplicity. To a large extent, law and account-
ing firms, as well as the sophisticated in-house advisers to the
few thousand large American multinational corporations, ad-
minister the foreign tax credit. This is an area where the play-
ers do study the rules.
Subpart F may not have kept up with information technol-
ogy, but neither have the source rules-the determination of
where income is earned. In fact, the source rules really have
never resolved the places where Pierre Boulez or Paul Karrer
or the Bank of America or Quill Corporation primarily should
be taxed.
The widespread criticism of subpart F-including certain
income of controlled foreign corporations in income of the par-
ent (but treating the income as that of the subsidiary)-has
not distinguished sufficiently among its different functions.
Two of the functions seem relatively uncontroversial: (1) the
current taxation of interest, dividends, and capital gains from
portfolio investments; and, (2) income from sales or services
transactions with related United States copnpanies. The former
prevents the use of income from mobile capital for the purpose
of avoiding United States tax. The latter deters erosion of the
United States tax base by siphoning profits from United States
companies through artificial intragroup transfer pricing.
By contrast, the two controversial aspects are the current
taxation of interest, royalties, dividends, and capital gains
from non-portfolio investments, and the taxation of income
from sales or services transactions between related foreign
companies. The former has nothing to do with mobile capital:
it consists of income from active businesses conducted by for-
eign subsidiaries and frequently (as in the payment of intra-
group interest and royalties) reduces foreign rather than Unit-
ed States tax. Similarly, income from sales or services transac-
9. Thus, income could consist of income for foreign royalties, interest, or
exports; but it equally could eliminate residence tax on domestic income.
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tions between related foreign companies has nothing to do with
the United States tax base-it deters erosion of a foreign
country's tax base by siphoning profits through artificial intra-
group transfer pricing.
The two controversial aspects stem from the idea that
subpart F acts as a sort of world tax policeman. It taxes, as
foreign personal holding company income payments, by one
foreign subsidiary to another, and the sales of the stock of one
foreign subsidiary by another, because they might not incur
substantial foreign tax; not because they represent income
from mobile capital or reduce United States tax.
Similarly, siphoning profits from foreign companies by
artificial intragroup transfer pricing saves foreign rather than
United States taxes. The check-the-box regulations, which have
to a great extent repealed the two controversial aspects of
subpart F, have highlighted this tax policeman role. The Trea-
sury has tried to treat, what for United States purposes are:
(a) intra-company payments; and, (b) sales of assets rather
than stock of subsidiaries: as (a) inter-company payments; and,
(b) sales of stock of subsidiaries. As the latter two, they would
constitute subpart F income unless they incurred sufficient
foreign tax. °
B. Whether the Proposal Would Create It
Exemption may not involve simplicity, but instead, it may
just raise old issues in an unfamiliar context.
1. Classification
The matter of classifying countries as high-or low-tax must
take into account not only their rate, but their base. This in-
volves judging the allowances, exemptions, and credits-as
10. See I.C.C. Code § 954(b)(4) (2000); I.R.S. Notice 98-35; I.R.B. 1998-27, 35
(1998); Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701(a)-3(h) (1996). A similar attitude surfaces in
section 864(c)(4), which taxes foreign corporations on foreign source income. This
was motivated by the fact that their residence countries did not tax them, so that
they could use the United States as a tax haven. But the motivation did not ap-
pear to arise from damage to the competitiveness of United States' banks in mak-
ing loans to Brazil. (In the 1960's, the United States had little reason to fear
competition in lending to Brazil.) Rather, it seemed to derive from a notion of tax
equity that the United States should enforce. See Post-Script, infra Part VII, for a
more recent manifestation of this attitude under Code section 367.
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applied by the foreign country-by the United States' stan-
dards of reasonableness. This is an extraordinarily difficult
task, as indicated by recent cases involving Ontario's mining
tax" and by base erosion tests in the branch profits tax and
in treaties. Much time has been spent-some by this commen-
tator-looking into whether deductions allowed by Luxembourg
were the equivalent of exemption under a 1929 decree. 2
Professor Rosenbloom knows, as well as anyone, the re-
sources available to the U.S. Department of Treasury to classi-
fy the tax systems of the world as to base, provisions for spe-
cial industries, arrangements for financing branches, and in-
centives for Alsace." Moreover, countries change their tax
systems and might not be eager to disclose an attempt to at-
tract investment, and yet preserve the United States exemp-
tion. The fact that a country, in general, has a high tax rate
means that it will not compete-as localities do with industrial
revenue bonds-for new industrial investment. To alleviate
this, the United States might grant an exemption by treaty, so
that only certain regimes within high-tax countries would
qualify.
2. Section 861 (to become Section 265) Regulations
As Professor Rosenbloom acknowledges, the issues of look-
ing through to classify income and of applying the section 861
regulations to allocate deductions would remain. In addition to
the allocation of research expense to foreign branches, an allo-
cation of worldwide interest expense among taxable income
and exempt foreign income probably would supersede the cur-
rent allocation of only domestic corporation interest.
3. Undeveloped Treaty Law
There arises the question of substituting an embryonic
OECD law-even as interpreted by the United States-for the
existing history of interpretation under our credit system. The
key terms for determining exempt income would be "business
11. See, e.g., Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm'r, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 1999).
12. If the deductions were equivalent, the old Luxembourg treaty did not
apply to United States income.
13. The European Union recently has identified sixty-six preferential tax re-
gimes within its jurisdiction that it suggests be eliminated.
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profits" and "attributable to a permanent establishment." In
deciding whether a permanent establishment existed, a 1995
Tax Court case went back to commentary by the League of
Nations as well as the OECD.'4 The question of what income
is attributable to a permanent establishment has been con-
tested sharply in two subsequent cases; one involving the in-
tracompany attribution of assets and the other of intra-compa-
ny assets and liabilities. 5 Both relied on the 1977 Commen-
tary to the OECD Model Convention, although one overlooked
the fact that-during some of the years before the court-the
United States had changed its position as to that commen-
tary.
16
C. Intra-company Payments
With respect to intra-company payments of interest and
royalties, the questions resemble those created under subpart
F by the check-the-box regulations. First, do intracompany
payments reduce business profits. of a permanent establish-
ment? Under a treaty, the United States has taken the posi-
tion that they do not. Under an exemption system, the United
States probably would want the payments to reduce business
profits attributable to the permanent establishment if the
foreign country allowed them to be deducted. A second ques-
tion is, if the recipient country taxed the interest or royalties
at a sufficiently high rate, would the interest or royalties con-
stitute business profits of the recipient?" This is not to say
that the issue cannot be resolved, but only that many of the
look-through, classification, and apportionment of deduction
issues, under a credit and deferral system, do not disappear
under an exemption and current inclusion system.
14. Taisei Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 535 (1995).
15. Northwest Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Comm'r, 107 T.C. 363 (1996)
(which had a concurrence and dissent); National Westminster Bank, PLC v. United
States, 44 Fed.CL. 120 (1999).
16. See Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises: Three Taxation Studies
(OECD 1984) (raising the question of whether interpretation of a treaty is static
or ambulatory).
17. See I.R.S. Notice 98-35; I.R.B. 1998-27, 35 (1998).
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D. Section 367 and Intangibles
With respect to the proposal on the section 367 issue, the
non-recognition of gain for the transfer of an active business
conducted abroad has been allowed under section 367 under a
deferral system. There seems no compelling reason to retract it
under the less favorable exemption regime.
The real section 367 and 861 issue under an exemption
system relates to the transfer of intangibles-whether the
United States would impute royalties to what is, for United
States tax purposes, the same entity. The United States has
perhaps the world's most valuable intangibles. Under the "com-
mensurate with income" standard, the United States reserves
the right to impute income from that value, to itself, as the
residence country. The concomitant of exemption, as proposed
by the paper, is the treatment of income earned by foreign
subsidiaries as the exempt income of branches. Under that
construct, domestic owners of those intangibles or the countries
of their use might believe that taxation of royalties (the yearly
value of the intangible) no longer should belong exclusively to
the United States.
From the point of view of the owners, the sourcing of in-
come from United States-developed intangibles in the country
of use-has allowed them to reduce foreign tax by deducting
the royalties paid by subsidiaries and to reduce United States
tax by excess credits attributable to other income. If the royal-
ties would be taxed by the United States at a rate higher than
that of the foreign country, they plausibly might argue that
one cannot impute royalty income within a corporation; from
one person to himself.'"
The foreign country might make the same argument: that
the entire profit from the intangible was attributable to the
country of use. Under current law, if the foreign subsidiary
actually were a branch, there would not be any imputation.
Instead, research expenses of the home office would be allocat-
ed to the branch under the section 861 regulations (and under
Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty).1a
18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(a)(1) (2000).
19. Under a treaty, in Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen,
[1998] 98 D.T.C. 6630 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada refused to allow im-
puted rent on a machine to reduce the profits of a United States corporation's
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The foreign country could take either of two positions.
One, that if the United States regarded the subsidiary as a
branch which could not, by definition, pay royalties, the income
of the subsidiary should be reduced only by the research ex-
penses, not by any royalties. The other would be to not disal-
low the deduction for royalties, but to disallow benefits under
Article 12 of its treaty with the United States, which limits tax
only on inter-company royalties. This raises for a foreign coun-
try the section 894(c) treaty issues created by the check-the-
box regulations, so that there would be another existing issue
under a new system. If the foreign country did not apply the
treaty and withheld substantial tax on the royalty, the United
States would either have to give a credit for such tax or allow
substantial double taxation on some of its most valuable as-
sets.
IV. THE BIG PICTURE AND Tm DETAILS
Let me conclude by going back to the beginning of this
comment, regarding the pace of change and the increasing
value of intangibles. The United States has not had a consis-
tent or successful international tax position as to intangibles.
It first let intangibles be transferred to foreign or possessions
corporations, litigated the results under section 482 with mixed
success, and then insisted on the residence country's right to
tax an amount of income commensurate with their value. The
"commensurate with income" standard is not one to which
other countries accede.
Thus, under domestic law and traditional ways of doing
business, the current system has not solved fully the problem
of taxing intangibles. The question of who should tax the value
of intangibles-the country that produced them, the country
where there are consumed, or both-has not been decided.
When licensed, they currently are sourced in the country of
consumption but by treaty often taxed only in the residence
country. When their value is realized in the form of transfer-
ring tangible goods or performing services, different source and
treaty rules apply. An exemption system would raise anew two
of the most controversial issues that have been tentatively
branch in Canada. A concurrence would have allowed a national rent expense
payable to the head office in other factual circumstances. See id.
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resolved under the credit system: (1) the source of income at-
tributable to United States-developed intangibles used abroad;
and, (2) the allocation of research expense deductions to those
intangibles.
With respect to taxing the value of intangibles attributable
to new types of doing business-both financial and especially
technological-the proposal would go to treaty law. But there
is no particular agreement within the OECD as to the charac-
ter of such transactions (transfer of technology, of goods, or of
services), its source, or how it should be taxed. For instance,
the distinctions as to character in the recent United States
section 861 computer software regulations 2 have not received
wide OECD acceptance. Further, the concept of what, if any,
profits are attributable to a permanent establishment consist-
ing of a Web site is in its draft stages. Grafting this issue onto
the OECD concept of profits attributable to a permanent estab-
lishment, when the value of intangibles has been given very
little consideration in that context, would seem to not foster
simplicity.
Moreover, as companies do business by sending and receiv-
ing signals, treaties might begin to permit the country of con-
sumption to tax their profits without requiring the existence of
a permanent establishment. As intangibles play a more and
more prominent role, the concept of permanent establishment
becomes less and less relevant to taxation.
V. EXEMPTION SEPARATED FROM DEFERRAL
The issue of exemption might be separated from ending
deferral. If profits are exempt when included currently, it does
not matter if their exemption is postponed until- they are repa-
triated. This would alleviate the problem of having the section
861 regulations, rather than 367(d), apply to the intra-group
transfer of intangibles, and the source country would be likely
to allow the royalties to be deducted from the payor
corporation's income.
To grant deferral to exempt profits, and include currently
in income only non-exempt profits, brings back the tainted
"subpart F" nomenclature, which Professor Rosenbloom is
clearly trying to avoid. But apart from financial institutions,
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18 (2000).
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multinationals generally have avoided the use of foreign
branches in treaty countries. The resulting lack of precedent as
to intra-company transactions may make it less wrenching to
retain an expanded subpart F (with respect to high-tax juris-
dictions) rather than to essay mandatory branches.
VI. CONCLUSION
Leonardo did not study the application of the 861 regula-
tions to intangibles. Had he known about it, he might not have
considered it necessary to master all human knowledge. Pro-
fessor Rosenbloom's paper takes a Leonardo-type overview, and
this comment goes into the details. But the U.S. system really
has never mastered the details-and they may not be just
details. There should be kudos on a paper that makes people
think seriously about how a theoretical proposal should be
implemented.
VII. POST-SCRIPT
At the symposium, two attendees who worked at the U.S.
Department of Treasury on the original subpart F regime de-
nied that it was intended to (or did) act as a world tax police-
man. One said that in the 1960's European countries just could
not cope with American manipulation of inter-company pricing.
But of course, that is just what a policeman does-come to the
aid of third parties."
More to the point, the government is still acting as a po-
liceman. Not only are Notice 98-35 and Proposed Regulations
section 1.7701(a)-3(h) directed at situations in which foreign
tax is avoided&2 (by paying interest or selling stock rather
than assets): the recently enacted section 367(a) regulations
adopt the same position. Under those regulations, if a United
21. The U.S. Treasury's Policy Study on Deferral referred to 1962 arguments
that "avoidance of foreign tax should not be of concern to the United States." U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CON-
TROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY, Appendix A, text at note 111,
(2000), available at http//www.ustreas.gov/taxpolicy/library/subpartf.pdf.
22. In Notice 98-35, foreign tax is avoided by deducting interest payments,
which for United States' purposes are just intra-company transfers of funds. See
I.R.S. Notice 98-35; I.R.B. 1998-27, 35 (1998). See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701(a)-
3(h) (1996) (foreign tax is avoided by selling what, for foreign purposes, is stock of
a subsidiary, but for United States' purposes, is a branch of the parent corpora-
tion).
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States corporation transfers assets to a foreign parent corpora-
tion in a non-recognition transaction, there is no further conse-
quence if the foreign parent sells the transferred assets. But if
the United States corporation transfers assets to a subsidiary
of the foreign parent corporation, gain will be recognized (as if
the transfer were taxable) if the subsidiary is sold within five
years.' The question of whether to impose United States tax
in respect of the resale apparently depends on whether foreign
tax might be imposed on that sale. It is assumed that the for-
eign parent can sell the assets without incurring foreign tax"
if they are owned by a subsidiary, but not if they are owned
directly.
Pointing out when the United States is acting as tax po-
liceman does not imply disagreement with that role. It can be
said to reinforce capital export neutrality and to prevent harm-
ful tax competition. But it should be recognized that deterring
the avoidance of foreign tax-thus protecting the tax systems
of other countries-is police work.
23. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.367(a)-3(a)(3) (2000) as to asset reorganizations. See
also Tress. Reg. §§ 1.367(a)-3(d)(1) (2000) with respect to indirect stock transfers
and applicability of a gain recognition agreement.
24. The Netherlands, for example, does not tax income from the sale of a
foreign subsidiary, which owns the assets received from the United States transfer-
or.
20011 1577

